All of this is of a piece with a strategy that is old as the Chinese Internet itself. In 1997, when only a few hundred thousand people were online in China, Geremie Barmé and Sang Ye published an article in Wired magazine titled 'The Great Firewall'. It was the first published use of the now common phrase that describes the cordon sanitaire that Chinese censors have erected to block Chinese Internet users from accessing, inter alia, all major international social media services and many foreign news sites.
Barmé and Sang described early work on what Chinese Internet users now refer to by the abbreviation GFW:
In an equipment-crowded office in the Air Force Guesthouse on Beijing's Third Ring Road sits the man in charge of computer and Net surveillance at the Public Security Bureau. The PSB-leizi, or 'thunder makers,' in local dialect-covers not only robberies and murder, but also cultural espionage, 'spiritual pollutants,' and all manner of dissent. Its new concern is Internet malfeasance.
A computer engineer in his late 30s, Comrade X (he asked not to be identified because of his less-than-polite comments about some Chinese ISPs) is overseeing efforts to build a digital equivalent to China's Great Wall. Under construction since last year, what's officially known as the 'firewall' is designed to keep Chinese cyberspace free of pollutants of all sorts, by the simple means of requiring ISPs to block access to 'problem' sites abroad.
State rhetoric about purifying the Internet intensified in 2012, the year that Chinese social media's ability to challenge the official narrative was probably at its lowest point to date. Calls to cleanse the Internet of 'poisons' and 'pollutants' have grown increasingly shrill every year, as documented in every edition of the China Story Yearbook since then. But he also remarked:
As mentioned in the
Our perspective is this: China is important, China is a rising economy. It is the secondlargest economy in the world. People should learn more about China. The coverage about China should be balanced and fair. Today when I see mainstream western news organisations cover China, they cover it through a very particular lens. It is through the lens that China is a communist state and everything kind of follows from that. A lot of journalists working with these western media organisations may not agree with the system of governance in China and that taints their view of coverage. We see things differently, we believe things should be presented as they are.
Or at least as they are through the equally particular lens of China's own media. In one frequently shared picture, Jiang confidently combs his hair in front of the King of Spain. In another, he gesticulates widely next to US president Bill Clinton. In yet another, Jiang, in waist-high swimming trunks and goggles, beams for a picture before diving into the Dead Sea-a comment reads 'I am utterly moved by the Elder's openness and confidence'.
To indicate laughter, fans replace the characters for 'haha' 哈哈 with the 'ha' from the character for 'toad' 蛤蛤. In toad worship culture, Jiang Zemin himself is called the 'Elder' 长者, a reference to one toad fan's favorite memory: in 2000, Jiang scolded Hong Kong reporter Sharon Cheung 张 宝华 at a press conference, referring to himself as an 'elder' with an imperative to impart some real-life experience to Hong Kong's simple-minded media. Cheung's Weibo account has become something of a virtual mecca for toad fans.
Toad worship delights in Jiang's unselfconscious and free-wheeling nature, a strong contrast with Xi Jinping's meticulously choreographed public image and self-important persona. Discussing the differences between Xi and Jiang is called xixihaha 习习蛤蛤, a pun on the onomatopoeia for the sound of laughter 嘻 嘻哈哈. In a thinly veiled satirical comment on Xi's staged 2013 visit to a Beijing steamed bun shop, some toad fans posted the slogan 'keep the toad, destroy the bun' 续蛤灭包. This was apparently too much: soon after this slogan appeared, censors eliminated most of the toad worship culture from the Internet.
